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STATE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS: LEGISLATING
WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
INTRODUCTION
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' the Supreme Court held that the Illinois
Business Takeover Act2 imposed a burden on interstate commerce that
outweighed any local interest served by the law.' In accord with this
case, courts struck down many local tender offer statutes. One state
refused to renew its law.' Thus, MITE Corp. has cast doubt on the
states' ability to regulate tender offers effectively.6
1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. Pub. Act No. 80-556, §§ 5.1.-14 (to be codified at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 121A '¢
137.51-70 (1983)), repealed by Pub. Act No. 83-365, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (effec-
tive Sept. 14, 1983).
3. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (White, J.). The Chief Justice joined Justice White.
Justices Powell, Stevens and O'Connor filed separate opinions, concurring with this part
of Justice White's commerce clause analysis. Id. at 646-55. Justice White thought that
the most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce was that it
purported to give the state the ability to prohibit a tender offer anywhere in the country.
See id at 643. The majority's opinion chilled any hopes states may have had of protect-
ing corporations from nationwide takeovers. The Court made it clear that states have no
legitimate interest in regulating out-of-state transactions. Id at 644. State tender offer
legislation must be for the sole protection of local investors. Compare id. (Illinois statute
purported to suspend takeovers on a nationwide basis) with Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v.
Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1984) (under Minnesota statute any suspension of the
tender offer applies only to state residents).
4. See; eg., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425, 1429-31 (10th
Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma statute violates the commerce clause); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,
697 F.2d 576, 582 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute violates the commerce clause); Mar-
tin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan statute
violates commerce clause); Ichan v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1414-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(Missouri statute violates supremacy and commerce clauses); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Wha-
land, 124 N.H. 1, 6, 466 A.2d 919, 922 (1983) (New Hampshire statute violates the com-
merce clause).
5. The Utah Take-Over Offer Disclosure Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-4-1 to -13,
repealed by Utah Sunset Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-55-7(4) (1978 & Supp. 1981) (effec-
tive July 1, 1983). The 1983 session of the Utah legislature did not reenact or replace the
Takeover Disclosure Act. Note, Edgar v. Mite Corp.: Is The Preemption of State Take-
over Statutes Complete?, 1983 Utah L. Rev. 415, 422 n.45.
6. The Court's use of the Pike balancing test, see MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643,
implies that there is some room for states to regulate tender offers, see id. at 646 (Powell,
J., concurring), but just how much room there is remains uncertain. The majority held
that the Illinois statute did not produce sufficient benefits to outweigh the burden it
placed on interstate commerce. See id. at 644-45 (disclosure required by the Illinois Act
did not put resident shareholders in a better position to make an informed decision when
faced with a tender offer). Because many takeover disclosure acts were similar, see New-
lin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act A New Approach to Deflect-
ing Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. Law. 111, 111 (1984), the Illinois Act was not alone
in its constitutional encroachments, see National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d
1122, 1128 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[o]ur examination reveals that there are no significant dis-
tinctions between the Illinois and Missouri Takeover Acts"). Justice White, with Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, held that because Congress chose to remain neutral
in takeover battles, states could not pass laws that favored management over the offeror.
See MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 631-40 (1982). Two Justices disagreed with this rationale,
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Some local legislatures responded by attempting to bring existing stat-
utes within constitutional guidelines.7 Others drafted new laws shifting
the regulatory focus from the purchase of securities to the "business
combinations"' that often follow a successful takeover.9
This new legislation raises questions."0 States must apply the statutes
constitutionally.'l Moreover, laws affecting business combinations may
violate the supremacy clause because they discourage tender offers. 12
This Note will examine the constitutional limitations on state takeover
statutes. Part I discusses the Williams Act 13 and state takeover statutes.
Part II sets out the constitutional analysis courts use to scrutinize state
tender offer legislation. Part III examines the clashes between takeover
legislation, past and present, and the Constitution. Part IV traces the
limits on the states' ability to regulate tender offers.
This Note concludes that states may regulate takeover bids, but only
to protect local investors. Local legislators cannot protect corporations
from hostile tender offers. The commerce clause permits states to regu-
saying that Congress' choice to remain neutral in takeover contests did not bind the
states. See id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 655
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Four failed to reach this issue.
Id. at 655-67 (Marshall, J. joined by Brennan, J., and Rehnquist, J. writing separately, do
not mention the preemption issue. O'Connor, J. expressly refused to discuss the issue);
see Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 909 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1984). See gener-
ally The Supreme Court 1981 Term, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 63-66 (1982). The plurality's
holding that states could not pass laws upsetting the federal policy of neutrality in take-
over battles was important because many states had designed their statutes to protect
target management. See Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to State Takeover
Legislation After Mite, 23 Washburn L.J. 473, 475 (1984); see, e.g., Pub. Act No. 80-556,
§§ 5.1.-14 (to be codified at Il. Ann. Stat. ch. 1211/2 11 137.51-70 (1983)), repealed by
Pub. Act No. 83-365, § 1 (Srnith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (effective Sept. 14, 1983); Mo. Ann.
Stat. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979).
7. New Hampshire amended its statute in 1983, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 421-
A:1-:15 (1983), after the state's highest court invalidated the law on commerce clause
grounds, see Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 124 N.H. 1, 6, 466 A.2d 919, 922 (1983).
Ohio was the first state to enact legislation to get around MITE Corp. Kreider, Fortress
Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act 11, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 108, 108 (1983). The
state did not repeal its pre-MITE statute, but instead supplemented the existing law. Id.;
see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1701.01, .11, .37, .48, .831, .832, 1707.01, .03, .042, .06, .07,
.08, .14, .23, .26, .44, .99 (Page 1985).
8. New York defines business combination broadly enough to encompass sales,
leases, mortgages and other dispositions of corporate assets. Act of Dec. 16, 1985, ch.
915, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2415 (to be codified at N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912(5)(B) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1986)).
9. See, e.g., Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-202, 3-601 to -602 (1985); Act of
Dec. 16, 1985, ch. 915, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2414 (to be codified at N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 912 (McKinney Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. BCL § 912].
10. See infra notes 85, 133, 134, 152 and accompanying text for state statute provi-
sions that present problems.
11. "Because we find that the Act is . . .constitutional on its face, we must also
analyze whether the Act is constitutional as applied by the Commissioner." Cardiff Ac-
quisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 914 (8th Cir. 1984).
12. See infra note 133.
13. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1982)).
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late only offers for "state corporations" to local residents. In addition, to
avoid conflicts with the supremacy clause, state legislation must conform
with the letter and spirit of the Williams Act.
I. THE LEGISLATION
A. State Statutes
States use two general classes of statutes to regulate takeovers. First
generation statutes regulate the actual purchase of securities. 4 These
laws resemble the Williams Act in both form 5 and substance.' 6 How-
ever, many of the state acts are better suited to protect incumbent man-
agement than local investors,' 7 while the purpose of the Williams Act is
to protect shareholders."
14. See Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Com-
merce Clause?, 8 Corp. L. Rev. 3, 3-4 (1985); see e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 409.500-.565
(Vernon 1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1707.04.1 (Page 1985); Va. Code § 13.1-528 to -
541 (1985).
15. Sargent, supra note 14, at 3-4.
16. Id A comparison between the first Ohio Takeover Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 1707.04.1-.04.2 (Page 1985), and the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1982), shows that the laws were analogous. The statutes require almost identical
disclosures in some instances.
Ohio Act Williams Act
1) Source and amount of funds or other
consideration used or to be used in
acquiring any equity security.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1707.04.1(B)(3)(c) (Page 1985).
2) Any plans or proposals of offeror
after gaining control to:
a. liquidate target
b. sells its assets
c. effect a merger
d. effect a consolidation
e. [make] major changes in
(1) business
(2) corporate structure
(3) management personnel
(4) employment policies.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1707.04.1(B)(3)(d)
(Page 1985).
3) The identity and background of all
persons on whose on whose behalf
transactions will be effected.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1707.04.1(B)(3)(b) (Page 1985)
1) Source and amount of the funds or
other consideration used or to be
used in making the purchases.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (1982).
2) Any plans or proposals of offeror,
after gaining control to:
a. liquidate target
b. sells its assets
c. effect a merger
d. [make] major changes [in]
(1) business
(2) corporate structure.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (1982).
3) Background, identity, residence,
citizenship, nature nature of
beneficial ownership of persons on
whose behalf transactions are to be
effected.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(A) (1982).
For further comparison, see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse: The Saga of State Takeover
Act Constitutionality Continues, 10 Cap. U.L. Rev. 129, 138-41 (1980).
17. See Sell, supra note 6, at 475.
18. See infra notes 26, 33, 118, 120, 121 and accompanying text.
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Second generation statutes do not directly regulate the purchase of se-
curities. 9 These statutes are part of state general corporation law and
usually regulate business combinations. 20 For example, the Maryland
law requires a successful offeror intending a "business combination"
either to obtain the approval of a supermajority of the disinterested
shareholders or to pay a "fair price" to nontendering shareholders forced
to sell in the course of the business combination.2 This statute inhibits
front-end-loaded two step takeovers,22 on the theory that such bids are
inherently unfair to nontendering shareholders.23 Section 912 of the
New York Business Corporation Law also restricts post-tender offer
"business combinations." 24
B. The Williams Act
Congress adopted the Williams Act in 1968 in response to the growing
use of tender offers as a means of capturing control of a corporation.25
The Act protects investors by requiring persons seeking control of a cor-
poration through tender offer, open market or privately negotiated
purchases of securities, to disclose relevant information to the target's
stockholders.26 This information includes the source of the funds the
offeror is using for the purchases, the purposes of the purchases, and the
background, identity, residence and citizenship of any person on whose
behalf the offeror makes purchases.27
In addition to disclosure requirements, the Act contains provisions
designed to mitigate the coercive influences of a tender offer. 28 For ex-
ample, the seven-day withdrawal29 and pro rata pick-up provisions30 re-
19. See Sargent, supra note 14, at 5.
20. See, e.g., Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-202, 3-601 to -603 (1985); Act of
Dec. 16, 1985, ch. 915, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2415 (to be codified at N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§ 912 (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
21. See Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-202, 3-601 to -603 (1985).
22. The two tier offer is really a single offer to acquire full control of a corporation.
The first step typically involves a cash offer for some of the target's shares. In the second
step, the offeror acquires the rest of the target's shares for securities worth less than the
cash paid for the first block of shares. Thus, the offer is front-end loaded. See Note,
Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application ofFederal And State Law To An Inno-
vative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 389, 389 (1982).
23. See Sargent, supra note 14, at 10; Maryland Bill on Takeovers spurs fight, Wall St.
J., May 26, 1983, at 33, col. 3.
24. See Act of Dec. 16, 1985, ch. 915, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2414 (to be codified at
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912(b) (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
25. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (plurality opinion of White, J.);
see 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 24,665 (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
26. See 113 Cong. Rec. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Congress wanted to
eliminate secrecy in securities transactions. The legislators stated that shareholders have
a right to know with whom they are dealing and the intentions of the offeror. See 113
Cong. Rec. 24,665 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(A)-(C) (1982).
28. See id. § 78n(d)(5)-(8).
29. See id. § 78n(d)(5) (a person who deposits shares pursuant to a tender offer can
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move some of the incentive to sell in haste allowing investors to consider
more carefully the decision to tender their shares.3
The Act favors neither incumbent management nor the offeror;32 it
promotes a federal policy of neutrality in takeover contests. Congress
did not intend the Williams Act to be a weapon that targets could use to
defeat tender offers.33 The lawmakers did not wish to discourage tender
offers.34 On the contrary, the lawmakers viewed takeovers as a check on
entrenched but inefficient management.35 The Williams Act's function is
to get information to investors by allowing both sides to present their
arguments.36 The Williams Act preempts any state statute that frus-
trates the full accomplishment of its policies or purposes.37
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEVORK
Many state statutes are invalid either in whole or in part because they
violate the commerce or supremacy clauses.
withdraw those shares at any time up to seven business days after definitive copies of the
tender offer are published or given to security holders).
30. See id § 78n(d)(6) (When the offer is for less than all the outstanding equity
shares of a class and more are tendered than the offeror is willing to take, the offeror will
take shares deposited within ten days of the offer's publication on a pro rata basis. This
removes some pressure on shareholders to tender immediatley for fear of being frozen out
of the offer.).
31. The Securities and Exchange Commission extended the seven day period to 15
days pursuant to its rule-making authority under the Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-
7(a)(1) (1985). The extension gives the security holders more time to consider the deci-
sion to deposit their shares. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,334 (1979).
The pro rata pick-up requirement is designed to outlaw the first-come, first-served
tender offer and eliminate pressure on shareholders to deposit their shares hastily. 113
Cong. Rec. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
32. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
33. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); see 113 Cong. Rec.
24,664 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping
the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover
bids."); id. at 854 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("Every effort has been made to avoid
tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of the
offeror.").
34. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2813; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982)
(plurality opinion of White, J.) (Congress did not want to discourage takeovers); 113
Cong. Rec. 24,666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (Congress did not intend to deny inves-
tors the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium above the market).
35. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (plurality opinion of White, J.).
See supra note 34.
36. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub non. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2811, 2813; 113 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 24,664
(1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
37. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632, 634 (1982) (plurality opinion
of White, J.); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (8th Cir.
1982); Ichan v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1418-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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A. Preemption
The supremacy clause 38 makes federal law paramount.39 State legisla-
tion interfering with or contrary to the laws of Congress is invalid.40
Though simply stated, preemption analysis involves more than apply-
ing doctrine to facts. The courts often have to balance state and federal
interests in regulating a particular activity.4 Courts can invalidate state
laws under any one of three theories,42 but warn that "there can be no
one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. 4
3
Courts can find that federal law preempts state law if Congress ex-
pressly manifests its intent that the federal law do so." The lawmakers
did not expressly prohibit states from regulating tender offers. 45 On the
contrary, section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 4 6 --to
which the Williams Act is an amendment-provides in pertinent part:
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities com-
mission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict
with the provisions of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder.47
Because Congress allowed the states to regulate tender offers, state take-
over statutes will violate the supremacy clause only if they conflict with
the Williams Act.48
38. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
39. Id. See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. I11.
L.F. 515 (author discusses the problems and theories involved in federal preemption of
state laws).
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.); see Hilisbor-
ough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985); Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
41. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956); Automated Medical
Labs., Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 722 F.2d 1526, 1531 (11 th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2371 (1985).
42. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375
(1985).
43. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
44. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); see Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
45. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1982) (plurality opinion of White,
J.); Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1984); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir. 1982).
46. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)).
47. Ch. 404, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 881, 903 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1982)).
48. Because Congress did not intend, either expressly or impliedly, to preempt state
tender offer regulation, Cardiff Acquistions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 913 (8th Cir.
1984), courts can only invalidate these statutes if they conflict with the Williams Act. See
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630-32 (1982) (plurality opinion of White, J.); see,
e.g., Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc., 751 F.2d at 913; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256, 1275 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1419-20 (W.D.
Mo. 1985).
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Under a second theory, a court may infer congressional intent to pre-
empt state law.4 9 The courts will draw this inference when the interests
involved are so intrinsically federal that it is reasonable to assume that
states may not regulate the subject,50 or the federal legislation is so perva-
sive as to indicate there is no room for supplemental local regulation.5"
Because Congress expressly gave states permission to regulate tender of-
fers, courts will not infer congressional intent to preempt local statutes.5 2
Finally, a court will also invalidate a state law if it conflicts with a
congressional mandate.53 A conflict arises when compliance with both
state and federal law is impossible 4 or when the local legislation stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional purposes.5 5
Courts have used the "obstacle" theory to scrutinize state takeover legis-
lation.56 When a state statute frustrates the full accomplishment of Con-
gress' objectives in adopting the Williams Act, it is preempted. 7
Justice White, expressing the views of a plurality of the Court in MITE
Corp.,5 8 stated that the Illinois Business Takeover Act was preempted
because it stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 9 Though only two Justices
49. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); accord Hillsbor-
ough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985); Icahn v.
Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Courts hesitate to infer congressional
intent to preempt state law. See, eg., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561-71
(1973); New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413-14 (1973);
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
50. See eg., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941); Hillsborough County v.
Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985); City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
51. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see, eg., Hillsbor-
ough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375-76 (1985); City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
52. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 630-32 (1982) (plurality opinion of
White, J.).
53. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 209-10 (1824) (Marshall, CJ.); see
also Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375
(1985); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941).
54. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); see
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371, 2375 (1985);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 & n.20 (1941).
55. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
363 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (quoting Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).
56. See eg., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-40 (1982) (plurality opinion of
White, J.) (Justice White, writing for the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, stated that
the Illinois Act examined in the case violated the supremacy clause by frustrating the
objectives of Congress); Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 912-14 (8th
Cir. 1984) (Minnesota act is consistent with the purpose of the Williams Act); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-33 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri Take-
over Bid Disclosure Act violates the supremacy clause).
57. See supra note 56.
58. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
59. See id. at 634 (plurality opinion of White, J.).
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concurred in this part of Justice White's opinion," the analysis was not
rejected by a majority6 and has been used by lower courts when examin-
ing state tender offer legislation.62
This last supremacy clause analysis is useful in looking at first and
second generation statutes because both are capable of frustrating the
Williams Act's policies. This kind of scrutiny will be applicable to sec-
ond generation legislation because, while states have avoided textual con-
flicts between their statutes and the Williams Act, some cling to pro-
management policies. 3
In MITE Corp., the Court did not consider the extent to which com-
pliance with both the Illinois statute and the Williams Act was impossi-
ble.' 4 However, this inquiry is part of supremacy clause jurisprudence
and lower courts have used it when examining state takeover
legislation.65
Even if a state takeover statute comports with the supremacy clause, it
may still impermissibly burden interstate commerce, and therefore be
invalid.
B. The Commerce Clause
The commerce clause66 gives Congress the power to "regulate Com-
merce ... among the several states."67 This grant of authority to the
federal government also imposes a restraint on state legislatures.68 States
60. See id.
61. Justice Powell and Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice White's supremacy
clause analysis. They did not believe that Congress' choice to remain neutral in takeover
contests obliged the states to adopt the same policy. See id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor and Rehnquist failed to reach the issue. See
supra note 6. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 909 n.1 (8th Cir.
1984).
62. See, e.g., Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 912-14 (8th Cir.
1984); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128-33 (8th Cir. 1982);
see also Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (using analysis
prior to MITE).
63. New York recently enacted legislation designed to promote the long-term growth
of local corporations. One of the effects of the law will be to discourage unilateral take-
overs that depend on the target's assets to finance the deal. Governor's Program Bill
Memorandum for 1985 Extraordinary Session at 1, 8; see N.Y. Legal Times, Jan. 20,
1986, at Al, col. 4, A15, col. 4.
Maryland's fair price statute also inhibits takeovers through restrictive merger provi-
sions. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for further discussion.
64. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1982) (plurality opinion of
White, J.).
65. See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1132 (8th Cir.
1982); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 12-13 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
66. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67. Id.
68. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976); see also Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252
(1946) ("[T]he Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact
laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own
force created an area of trade free from interference by the States.").
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may not directly regulate or restrain interstate commerce. 69 Moreover, a
local government cannot interfere with commerce that takes place
wholly outside its borders.7"
However, not all state regulation of interstate commerce is invalid.
When a statute regulates evenhandedly to further a legitimate public in-
terest and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.7"
Citing a legitimate interest is not enough. State legislators must draft
statutes that produce local benefits without needlessly burdening com-
merce.7 2 Many early attempts at local tender offer legislation failed on
this point.
The MITE Court found that the Illinois Business Takeover Act im-
posed excessive burdens on interstate commerce relative to the benefits to
the state.73 Justice White, writing for the Court, used the balancing test
of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc 4 to reach his conclusion. 5 Under the test,
courts balance the burden a statute places on interstate commerce against
the benefits to the regulating state.76 The extent of the burden the courts
will tolerate depends on the nature of the local interest involved and
whether it can be achieved with less impact on interstate activities.'
Many first generation statutes allowed state officials to suspend tender
offers on a national level if the bidder did not comply with state law.7
69. See Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 378
(1983) ("We struck down the regulation... because it... imposed a 'direct' rather than
an 'indirect' burden on interstate commerce."); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352,
396 (1913) ("If a state enactment imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce, it
must fall.") (emphasis in original); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289, 302 (1894)
("[N]othing which is a direct burden upon interstate commerce can be imposed by the
State."). Four Justices in MITE Corp. agreed that the Illinois Business Takeover Act
directly regulated commerce because it applied to transactions taking place across state
lines. The statute even applied to transactions effected totally outside the state's borders.
In fact, the Act could have applied to a tender offer that did not involve a single Illinois
resident. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-43 (1982) (plurality opinion of
White, J.).
70. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion of
White, J.); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex reL Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945).
71. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 642 (1982); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960).
72. The putative local interests protected by the statute are not dispositive. See Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644-46 (1982); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air,
Inc., [1985-86 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,331, at 92,190 (D. Minn.
1985). If state statutes fail to provide local benefits, they cannot pass commerce clause
scrutiny. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644-46.
73. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-46 (1982).
74. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
75. See MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643.
76. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at
643.
77. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
78. See, eg., Pub. Act No. 80-556, § 1 I-(H) (to be codified at I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 121./2,
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These statutes failed under the Pike test because the extent of the burden
on commerce was great, and the state could have protected local inves-
tors without suspending the tender offer outside its borders.79
Justice White also thought the Illinois act violated the commerce
clause by directly regulating interstate commerce. s0 And although the
majority did not go along with that part of his opinion, s" a district court
in Icahn v. Blunt 2 used this theory to strike down a Missouri takeover
statute.3
Second generation statutes regulate commerce indirectly8 4 and so
should be analyzed under the Pike test. The result of the analysis is un-
certain because the courts have yet to determine the burden imposed by
these statutes. It is clear, however, that second generation statutes make
some kinds of takeovers more difficult. For instance, if the bidder needs
the captured corporation's assets to finance the tender offer, restrictive
merger provisions effectively prevent the takeover.s5 Whether the local
benefits of these statutes will tilt the scale in the states' favor remains to
be seen.8 6
% 137.11(H) (1983)), repealed by Pub. Act No. 83-365, § I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)
(effective Sept. 14, 1983); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979). In MITE
Corp., Justice White held that the Illinois Act was a direct regulation of interstate com-
merce because state officials could use the statute to prohibit transactions between non-
residents. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 642; see National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687
F.2d 1122, 1128 (8th Cir. 1982) ("our examination reveals... no significant distinctions
between the Illinois and Missouri Takeover Acts").
79. See MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644. The majority in MITE Corp. noted that states
have no legitimate interest in protecting out-of-state shareholders. Therefore, the state
gets no benefit from protecting nonresident investors and there is nothing to weigh
against the statute's harmful effects on interstate commerce. Id.
80. See id. at 640-42 (plurality opinion of White, J.).
81. The Chief Justice joined Justice White's entire opinion. Justices Stevens and
Powell filed separate opinions concurring with this part of Justice White's opinion. See
id. at 626, 646-47.
82. 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
83. See id. at 1414-17 (Missouri statute prohibiting sales of a control block of shares
without approval of a supermajority of the stockholders was a direct regulation of inter-
state commerce because the law was applicable to foreign corporations and state officials
could use it to inhibit transactions between nonresidents).
84. See supra note 19.
85. See Sargent, supra note 14, at 10 (Maryland statute is designed to inhibit front-
end loaded two-tier takeovers); Pinto, Constitutionality of N.Y. 's New Takeover Statute,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 4, at 30, col. I (§ 912 of the New York Business
Corporation Law may, through its restrictive business combination provisions, prevent
takeovers because the offeror would not be able to use the target's assets to leverage the
transaction).
86. Because the nature of the burdens second generation statutes place on interstate
commerce is uncertain, it is impossible to say whether the putative local benefits will
outweigh the burdens. In addition, how well second generation statutes promote the
states' interests is an important question. If the statutes fail to provide benefits, the bur-
dens they impose on interstate commerce will be hard to justify. For a more detailed
discussion, see Sargent, supra note 14, at 26-34.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CURRENT STATE STATUTES
State takeover statutes are of two general types. First generation stat-
utes resembled the Williams Act. They directly regulated the purchase
and sale of securities."7 Courts held many first generation laws unconsti-
tutional after MITE Corp."8 The statutes' extra-territorial effect violated
the commerce clause, and some were counter to the purposes and objec-
tives of Congress. 9 For example, in National City Lines, Ina v. LLC
Corp. 90 the Eighth Circuit held that the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclo-
sure Act9' was contrary to the commerce and supremacy clauses.9 2
The statute's commerce clause problem was fundamental. The Mis-
souri legislature purported to give the state attorney general the author-
ity to regulate or prohibit a tender offer wherever it might take place.
93
The Act's jurisdictional requirements did not limit its application to Mis-
souri residents.94 This is a flaw the statute shared with the Illinois law
struck down in MITE Corp. 95 Missouri tried to prohibit tender offers to
out-of-state investors but, because a state has no legitimate interest in
protecting nonresident investors,96 there was no local benefit to balance
against the burden on interstate commerce.9" Thus, the law excessively
burdened interstate commerce.98
The Missouri legislation did not fare well under a preemption analysis
either. Compliance with the statute and the Williams Act was impossi-
ble, because the state and federal timetables did not match.9 The Mis-
87. See supra note 14.
88. See supra note 4.
89. See supra note 4.
90. 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
91. Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979).
92. See National City Lines, Inc, 687 F.2d at 1128-33.
93. See Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 409.505(4)-(5), 409.535 (Vernon 1979). The Missouri leg-
islature defined offeree as a person, whether a shareholder of record or a beneficial owner,
to whom a takeover bid is made. See id. § 409.505(4). The statute did not require the
offeree shareholder to be a Missouri citizen and thus could reach transactions between
shareholders anywhere in the country. The statute also defined offeree company broadly
enough to include out-of-state corporations. Therefore, the law covered corporations
only loosely tied to the state. See id § 409.505(5).
94. The statute applied to an offer for shares of a company incorporated in the state
or with a principal place of business or executive office there. Id. § 409.505.5(a), (b).
Under these standards, a state could exercise jurisdiction over tender offers for companies
that have only an office or retail outlet in the state, but not a single local shareholder.
95. National City Lines, 687 F.2d at 1128, 1133. The court stated that because the
two statutes were for all practical purposes identical, the Supreme Court's holding in
MITE Corp. governed the commerce clause issues presented by the Missouri act. Id. at
1128.
96. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
97. Id
98. Id. at 646.
99. National City Lines, 687 F.2d at 1130. The Williams Act confers broad rule-
making authority on the Securities and Exchange Commission to require the filing of
reports in takeovers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). SEC Rule 14d-2(b) requires an
offeror to begin the offer or withdraw his bid within five days after making it public. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1985). The Missouri statute conflicted with the Williams Act
1986]
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souri statute gave management weapons 1°° that tipped the balance of
power in contests for corporate control.'o' This result was contrary to
the purposes and objectives of the Williams Act. Therefore, the law vio-
lated the supremacy clause.
10 2
Many first generation statutes resembled the Missouri act.' 0 3 It was
clear that states had to find an alternative way to regulate tender offers.
Second generation statutes shift the regulatory focus away from the
purchase of securities. They regulate the tender offer through substan-
tive provisions in the general corporation law, specifically those dealing
with business combinations.' °4
Section 912 of the New York Business Corporation Law is an exam-
ple.l05 The statute prevents an offeror who gains twenty percent or more
of a "resident domestic corporation's" stock from engaging in certain
"business combinations" for five years from the date the bidder gained
twenty percent of the stock.'0 6 To avoid this prohibition the offeror must
gain the approval of the board of directors, prior to becoming the benefi-
cial owner of twenty percent of the shares, for the acquisition of the
twenty percent or for any prospective business combination. 107
After the five-year period, a New York resident corporation still can-
not enter into a business combination with an interested shareholder un-
less a majority of the disinterested shares approve the deal.108 The
interested shareholder can escape this proscription if he pays a "fair
price" to the minority shareholders. 109
Second generation statutes are primarily matters of state corporation
law and regulate interstate commerce indirectly. Therefore, the local
benefit of one of these laws must outweigh the burden it places on inter-
state commerce. The extent of the burden a court will tolerate, however,
by requiring the offeror to wait 20 days after making detailed disclosures to the target
company and the State commissioner before commencing the offer. See Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 409.515.1 (Vernon 1979). The statute also contained a hearing provision that allowed
the commissioner to extend this period. See id. § 409.515.1(2).
100. The hearing provision allowed the target to delay the offer. Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 409.515.1(2) (Vernon 1979). Delay is a potent weapon in a takeover battle. See infra
note 122.
101. National City Lines, Inc., 687 F.2d at 1132-33.
102. Id. at 1128-33.
103. See Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act: A New State
Approach to Deflecting Corporate Takeover Bids, 40 Bus. Law. 111, 111 (1984). The
typical first generation state takeover statute had three main provisions: a precommence-
ment statement of intention provision, an administrative hearing provision and a provi-
sion that allowed a state official to suspend the offer if he found it to be unfair. Courts
found these provisions contrary to either the supremacy or commerce clauses. Id
104. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
105. Act of Dec. 16, 1985, ch. 915, § 2, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2415 (to be codified at N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney Supp. 1986)).
106. Id. § 912(a), (b).
107. Id. § 912(b).
108. Id. § 912(c)(2).
109. Id. § 912(c)(3).
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depends on whether the state could attain the same benefit with a lesser
impact on interstate commerce." 0 Many second generation statutes vio-
late the commerce clause because there are less restrictive methods that
states could use to achieve their goals.' 1'
The supremacy clause analysis will inevitably depend on whether state
and federal policies can coexist. Local statutes that frustrate the policies
of the Williams Act are invalid." 2
IV. STATE STATUTES THAT WILL SURVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
A. Avoiding Preemption
There is room for states to regulate tender offers. However, state stat-
utes must be free of all substantive conflicts with the Williams Act. Pro-
visions that call for prior notification by the offeror to the target
company or frustrate any of the federal timetables invite preemption." 3
Requiring the bidder to warn incumbent management of the impending
takeover conflicts with the federal statute. Under the Williams Act, a
bidder must commence an offer within five days of making it public." 4
Laws that require an offeror to warn the target twenty days in advance"I5
make compliance with federal law impossible"16 because the offeror can-
not begin the offer within the five-day period. Precommencement provi-
sions also give management a potent weapon in a takeover battle." 7
States must also avoid clashes with congressional policy on takeover
bids. The underlying purpose of the Williams Act is to protect investors,
110. See infra notes 139, 144 and accompanying text.
111. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
112. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
113. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 634-39 (1982) (plurality opinion of
White, J.); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1130-32 (8th Cir.
1982); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1418-20 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
New York BCL § 912 takes a unique approach to the precommencement notification
provision. The statute prohibits a bidder who acquires 20% or more of the stock of a
domestic resident corporation from entering into certain business combinations with that
corporation unless the bidder gets prior board approval for the 20% acquisition or the
prospective business combination. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 912(b) (McKinney Supp.
1986). The law does not frustrate the Williams Act timetables because the offeror can
purchase securities before getting board approval. The prohibition is only effective if the
offeror purchases 20% of the stock. Id. §§ 912(a)(10), (a)(5), (b). Offerors who have to
use target assets to finance the takeover, however, will be forced to give targets advance
warning of the takeover by requesting approval for. purchases or business combinations.
See id. § 912(b).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1985).
115. See Newlin & Gilmer, supra note 103, at 111 (most first generation statutes re-
quire notice of between 10 and 20 days before the offer becomes effective).
116. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1130 (8th Cir. 1982);
see, eg., Mo. Ann. Stat. § 409.515.1 (Vernon 1979).
117. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 635 (1982) (plurality opinion of White,
J.) (Congress considered putting a precommencement provision in the Williams Act but
rejected the idea).
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not incumbent management. 1 8  Protecting management, or making
takeovers more difficult, hurts investors by depriving them of the oppor-
tunity to tender their shares at a premium above the market price. 119
Courts should invalidate state statutes that frustrate the accomplishment
of the lawmakers' goals.
It is also clear that Congress was careful to avoid favoring either in-
cumbent management or the takeover bidder.' Thus, states cannot en-
act laws that undermine this policy of neutrality.12 1 For example, laws
that protect management from hostile takeovers by causing delay in the
tender offer would conflict with Congress' intent.12 2
The Williams Act requires extensive disclosure of the facts surround-
ing a tender offer.' 23 Local legislators can call for disclosure in addition
to any prescribed by Congress. 124 States must, however, be careful not to
confuse investors.'2 5 The additional facts must be within the spirit of the
Williams Act. A state can only require information that will help resi-
dent investors make decisions.126 State laws cannot require disclosures
118. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. See 113 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967)
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
119. See MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 633 n.9 ("Congress... did not want to deny share-
holders 'the opportunities which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock
of a given company,' namely, the opportunity to sell shares at a premium over their
market price.") (quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 24,666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
120. 113 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 24,664 (remarks
of Sen. Williams); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2813.
121. See supra note 6.
122. Time is a staunch ally of management in contest for corporate control. See Wil-
ner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Laws And Their Constitutionality, 45
Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1976); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2572, 2644 (report on Hert-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976) (delay gives incumbent management time to en-
gage in defensive measures and more easily defeat a takeover attempt).
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). "All shareholders should have such informa-
tion so that they can make informed investment decisions on the basis of the same facts
known by the person making the tender." 113 Cong. Rec. 855 (1967) (remarks of Sen.
Williams); see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627-28 n.2 (1982) (The Williams Act
"requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the target shares, past trans-
actions with the target company, the other material financial information about the of-
feror." The bidder must also disclose any legal problems that may result if the takeover is
successful.).
124. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1982); Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc.
v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 912 (8th Cir. 1984).
125. The Williams Act requires extensive disclosure of the facts surrounding a take-
over. See supra note 123. Congress, however, was careful to avoid swamping investors
with so much information that relevant data would be lost among irrelevant data. See
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1978) (SEC tries to
avoid requiring disclosure of documents that are so detailed that shareholders will not
read them), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979); E. Aranow, H. Einhorn & G. Berlstein, Developments In Tender Offers For
Corporate Control 219-20 (1977) (relevant information can be obscured by insignificant
disclosures).
126. In MITE Corp., Justice White was not convinced that the disclosure the Illinois
Act required enhanced a shareholder's position when faced with a tender offer. See Ed-
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that would overwhelm the shareholder with a mass of irrelevant informa-
tion or be excessively burdensome to the offeror.12
In fact, the only significant disclosure local legislators can require is
information concerning the effects of the takeover on their state or its
residents.' This type of information can help the investor to make an
educated choice.' 2 9
State tender offer legislation must help the investor to decide whether
to tender his shares. This follows federal policy. 3' Local authorities
may not judge the fairness of the offer. That is for the shareholder to
decide. 3' Local officials can require factual disclosure and halt the bid-
to state residents only-if they find the facts disclosed are insufficient to
gar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). Much of the protection the Illinois Act
provided was already afforded by the Williams Act. Id. at 644-45. Compare Cardiff
Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1984) (the Minnesota statute
generally conforms with the spirit of the Williams Act) with National City Lines, Inc. v.
LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1982) (the Missouri law conflicted with
both the letter and spirit of the Williams Act). The disclosure requirements at issue in
National City Lines were broad and open-ended. For example, one provision allowed the
Commissioner to require any disclosure necessary for the public interest. See Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 409.515.2 (1979). Most of the disclosures at issue in Cardiffwere consistent with
the Williams Act. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc., 751 F.2d at 913-14.
127. See supra note 125. See Cardiff Acquisitions Inc., v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 909, 914
(8th Cir. 1984).
128. In Cardiff, the Eighth Circuit held that the additional disclosures Minnesota re-
quired, with two exceptions, were consistent with the Williams Act. Cardiff Acquisitions,
Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 914 (8th Cir. 1984). These additional disclosures concerned
the effects of the takeover on the target company's operations, its employees, suppliers
and customers and the communities in which it operates. Id.; see Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 80B.03(6)(c) (West Supp. 1986). These disclosures are within the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act. Congress wanted investors to know what the effects of a takeover would be so
that the shareholders could weigh them in making their decisions. See supra note 123.
States can require disclosure that conforms with the spirit of the Williams Act, and helps
investors make informed decisions. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906,
914 (8th Cir. 1984).
129. See supra note 128.
130. See 113 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 24,664 (1967)
(remarks of Sen. Williams); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2813. "Congress relied upon a 'market approach' to
investor protection. The function of [the Williams Act] is to get information to the inves-
tor by allowing both the offeror and the [target's] managers to present fully their argu-
ments and then to let the investor decide for himself." Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted), rev'd on other grounds
sub nor. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
131. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 433 U.S. 173 (1979); see
also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 27 (1977) ('[T]he general approach ... of
[the Williams Act] is to provide the investor, the person who is required to make a deci-
sion, an opportunity to examine and to assess the relevant facts.") (quoting Hearings on
S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967)); 113 Cong. Rec. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Wil-
liams); id at 24,664 (remarks of Sen. Williams); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2813 (disclosure is for the
benefit of the investor).
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allow the investor to make an informed choice.1 32
States cannot enact laws that discourage tender offers. Congress has
decided that tender offers check entrenched but inefficient manage-
ment. 133 Many second generation statutes make some types of takeovers
impossible 134 and are therefore vulnerable to preemption. New state
statutes must protect local investors without hampering the tender offer.
A statute similar to the Williams Act requiring additional disclosures
relevant to local shareholders would protect investors without offending
federal policy.
B. Comporting With The Commerce Clause
Local tender offer legislation must not directly affect shareholders
outside the state's jurisdiction. Courts can strike down laws with an
extra-territorial effect on either of two grounds. They can invalidate the
legislation as a direct regulation of interstate commerce 35 or find that
any indirect burden the statute places on interstate commerce is not out-
weighed by its benefit to the state. 1 36 Regulations that affect only state
residents can promote local interests with a minimal effect on interstate
132. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1984)
(Minnesota Commissioner could not judge the offer's fairness, but could require disclo-
sure to be comprehensive enough to allow shareholders to determine for themselves
whether they should retain or sell their stock).
133. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2813. Second generation statutes, however, can discourage
tender offers. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Discouraging tender offers is
contrary to congressional policy. Three Justices stated in MITE Corp. that the states
could not frustrate federal policy through local statutes. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 630-40 (1982) (plurality opinion of White, J.) (White, J. joined by Burger, C.J.,
and Blackmun, J.). Second generation statutes violate the supremacy clause because they
do not protect investors. Many of these laws hurt shareholders by depriving them of an
opportunity to tender their shares at a premium above the market price. "Congress...
did not want to deny shareholders 'the opportunities which result from the competitive
bidding for a block of stock of a given company,' namely, the opportunity to sell shares
for a premium over their market price." Id. at 633 n.9 (plurality opinion of White, J.)
(quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 24,666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
134. Restrictive business combination provisions will prevent offerors who need the
target's assets to finance the purchase of shares from making successful takeovers. See
supra note 85 and accompanying text. See infra note 152.
135. See Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1414-17 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (state statutes
that directly regulate transactions between out-of-state shareholders violate the com-
merce clause). Control share acquisition statutes make the purchase of large blocks of
shares contingent on the approval of a majority of the disinterested shareholders. These
laws apply equally to all transactions, whether they take place within or outside of the
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.671(3), (4) (West 1985). The statutes are
invalid because they directly regulate interstate commerce. See Ichan, 612 F. Supp. at
1414-17. See supra note 80-83 and accompanying text.
136. This is the MITE Corp. majority's analysis. A state has no legitimate interest in
protecting nonresident shareholders. The state gets no benefit from prohibiting a tender
offer outside its borders. If a local statute prohibits transactions between nonresidents,
the Pike balance will come out against the state. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
643-44 (1982). See supra note 72.
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activities. 37 State laws that promote a legitimate public interest and reg-
ulate commerce only incidentally are valid unless they excessively burden
interstate commerce. Statutes that interfere with or that prevent transac-
tions between out-of-state residents are invalid because, although they
may promote a local interest, these regulations needlessly burden inter-
state commerce.1 38 States must pursue local goals by means that least
affect interstate commerce.139
Local governments have a legitimate interest in protecting resident in-
vestors"4 and in regulating the internal affairs of domestic corpora-
tions. '4 Courts have also accepted as legitimate the states' interest in
having benevolent management heading resident corporations. 42 This
raises the question of whether local legislations can seek the benefits of
benevolent management through restrictive takeover statutes.
The answer is no. As noted, citing a legitimate interest is not enough
to pass commerce clause muster. A law must provide benefits to the
state.143 If an organization's management has a particular expertise or
social policy that a state finds valuable, protecting that management from
a takeover will not ensure that the corporation will continue to behave in
the same way. Policy shifts or internal personnel changes can bring new
management, new ideas and an end to the benefits that the prior manag-
ers bestowed on the state.
137. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 909-10 (8th Cir. 1984). States
have no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). Therefore, insofar as a state statute burdens out-of-state
transactions there is no benefit to the state to sustain the law. Id. Statutes that only affect
local residents avoid burdens on interstate commerce and protect local investors. See
supra notes 135, 136.
138. See supra notes 135-137.
139. "[T]he extent of the burden [on interstate commerce] that will be tolerated will of
course depend on... whether [the state's interest] could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see
Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 372 (1976) (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at
142).
140. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982); Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v.
Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644); Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
141. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 n.53 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); see also Note, The 1983 Amendments to
Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law: Unconstitutional? MITE Be, 89 Dick. L. Rev.
401, 416-17 (1985) [hereinafter cited as MITE Be].
142. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282-83 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
143. In the commerce clause analysis, the court balances the burdens a statute places
on interstate commerce against the actual benefits to the state, not the interest the state is
trying to promote. APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., [1985-86 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,331, at 92,190 (D. Minn. 1985). If a statute is
designed to protect local investors-a legitimate local interest-but fails to do so, no
benefits will accrue to the state and the law will fail to pass the Pike test. See supra notes
72, 76 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, local governments must promote legitimate interests in
ways that have the least affect on interstate commerce.' 44 Preventing
takeovers is not the most efficient way to foster benevolent management.
States can set minimum competency standards for local management.
For example, if a state had an interest in having expert management run-
ning the local utility company, implementing minimum competency
standards would guarantee that whomever was in charge of the company
would have the requisite expertise for the job. Local legislators can force
resident corporations to implement environmental programs and can en-
courage social programs with tax incentives. 45 Preventing takeovers
only hurts local investors by removing some of the inducement for in-
cumbent management to perform efficiently. Also, laws that protect cor-
porations from takeovers will face supremacy clause problems. 146
Local legislators can only regulate tender offers for corporations that
are closely tied to the state.147 Local lawmakers must define "target
company" narrowly to include only corporations that have a close nexus
with the state. 14' The close connection requirement prevents states from
exercising jurisdiction over takeovers that they have no legitimate inter-
est in regulating. 149  If the target does not have a strong link with the
state, a successful takeover will not have the kind of results that are im-
portant to local residents. For example, if the acquirer liquidates a "for-
eign" corporation, the state would not lose a significant number of jobs
or substantial revenue. Therefore, a successful tender offer would have
no effects worth disclosing to state residents. The close connection re-
quirement also minimizes potential burdens on interstate commerce by
preventing several states from exercising jurisdiction over a single tender
offer.
The required connection exists only when the target company has sub-
stantial assets in the state and local residents hold a "large" percentage of
the target's shares.' 50 The percentage of a company's share state resi-
144. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
145. See Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1286; MITE Be, supra note 141, at 436-37.
146. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
147. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1984). In
upholding the Minnesota statute, the court compared it with the Illinois act struck down
in MITE Corp. The Minnesota statute applied only when at least 20% of the target's
shareholders lived in the state and the target had at least $1,000,000 of in-state assets.
See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80B.01(9) (West Supp. 1986). By contrast, the Illinois act could
apply to a tender offer that did not involve a single Illinois shareholder. Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion of White, J.). In that situation it
would be hard to imagine how the statute would protect local investors.
148. See supra note 147.
149. Illinois claimed that its takeover act promoted two local interests, the protection
of local investors and the regulation of the internal affairs of state corporations. Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). The court found this hard to believe because the
statute could be applied to tender offers that did not involve a single Illinois resident, see
id. at 642 (plurality opinion of White, J.), and to targets incorporated in other states, see
id. at 645.
150. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1984). In this
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dents hold must only be large when considering the number of shares
outstanding and the percentage held by investors in other states. For
example, if New York residents hold five percent of the shares in XYZ
corporation, and that five percent represents a large number of the out-
standing shares, New York could regulate a takeover for XYZ Corp.
provided that residents of no other state owned a substantially higher
percentage of the company's stock.
A state's interest in protecting local investors is more clearly impli-
cated when its residents hold a large percentage of the target's securi-
ties.1 51 Moreover, successful offerors often must use the assets of the
captured corporation to finance the takeover. 52 Local investors should
have an opportunity to consider the effects of such sales on their state
before deciding to tender their shares. For instance, if a successful take-
over would mean a loss of jobs or tax revenue for the state, resident in-
vestors might not want to tender their shares.
A strong nexus will help avoid commerce clause problems. Laws lim-
ited in scope to local corporations with close ties to the state fare well
under the commerce clause analysis. They do not directly regulate inter-
state commerce. 1
53
If a state law indirectly regulates interstate commerce, the courts will
screen it under the Pike test. 54 If the target has a large percentage of
investors and substantial assets in the state, the presence of a legitimate
local interest is clear. If the scope of the statute is limited to local resi-
dents, the burden on interstate commerce is not excessive.' 55 Target
companies must have a large percentage of local investors and assets
before state tender offer legislation can constitutionally apply to them.
case, the court upheld a Minnesota statute that applied only when at least 20% of the
target's shareholders were state residents and the target had substantial assets in the juris-
diction. Id.; see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80B.01(9) (West Supp. 1986). A state can only regu-
late tender offers for corporations that are closely tied to it. This is because a state has no
legitimate interest in and thus derives no benefits from protecting out-of-state investors or
regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 644-46 (1982). The MITE Court struck down the Illinois Takeover Act because its
putative local benefits were not enough to sustain the statute's sweeping extra territorial
effect. Id. The statute could apply to takeovers that did not involve a single Illinois
resident. Id. at 642 (plurality opinion of White, J.). For state takeover statutes to survive
commerce clause scrutiny, local lawmakers have to draft them narrowly to provide local
benefits while not placing excessive burdens on interstate commerce. See CardiffAcquisi-
tions, Ina, 751 F.2d at 909-12.
151. This would avoid the problem presented by the Illinois statute in Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (statute regulating takeovers that did not involve a single
state resident). See supra note 147.
152. Pinto, supra note 85, at 30, col. 2.
153. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911-12 (8th Cir. 1984)(these statutes promote local interests while having minimal effects on interstate com-
merce). See supra notes 147, 149.
154. See, eg., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (plurality opinion of
White, J.); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
155. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911 (1984). See supra note
147.
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If an offeror does not comply with a state provision the state can sus-
pend the offer, but only to its residents. States have no power to suspend
an offer to residents of another jurisdiction. 156 A state receives no benefit
from protecting investors in other states. 157 Suspending an offer to out-
of-state residents puts an excessive burden on interstate commerce and
tilts the Pike balance against the regulating state.15 8
Local legislatures can draft effective takeover statutes if these laws ap-
ply only to tender offers for state corporations to local residents. States
cannot protect incumbent management, by blocking tender offers on a
national level, and stay within the bounds of the commerce clause.
CONCLUSION
States can regulate tender offers but not in a manner contrary to the
Williams Act or the commerce clause. Local legislatures can protect res-
ident investors. They cannot shield corporations from nationwide take-
overs. Any statute that discourages tender offers is subject to
preemption. State statutes that give local authorities the power to sus-
pend offers on a national level violate the commerce clause.
There is room for the states to regulate tender offers but any regulation
must be in accordance with federal policy and the commerce clause. For
example, states can require offerors to disclose information in addition to
that required under the Williams Act. The information must be helpful
to local investors deciding whether to accept the tender offer. Disclo-
sures that confuse the shareholder or that are excessively burdensome to
the offeror defeat the purpose of the Williams Act. If the offeror fails to
comply with state law, local authorities can suspend the offer in the state
until the bidder satisfies the statutory obligations.
Michael A. McIntosh
156. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). See supra note 135.
157. Id.
158. Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1984); see Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). In MITE Corp. the statute at issue affected
investors outside the state. It failed to pass commerce clause scrutiny. Id. at 644-46.
The statute challenged in Cardiff allowed the Commissioner to suspend an offer only to
state residents if the offeror failed to comply with it. The court upheld the law. Cardiff
Acquisitions, 751 F.2d at 911.
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